Abstract
Introduction
The topic of "designing for flexibility in engineering systems" is of much interest at the Engineering Systems Division at MIT. In financial markets, options and derivatives on securities have been adopted as proven mechanisms of coping with uncertainty [1] . A financial option gives its owner the right, but not the obligation, to take a particular course of action in the future, thus provides flexibility in the decision making process with the objective of limiting downside losses while capitalizing on upside opportunities. Building on financial options valuation approaches, Real Options Valuation (ROV) has been emerging in the past few years as a set of tools, or perhaps a discipline, that applies ideas from quantitative finance to engineering projects. Real Options analysis is used in strategic planning to cope with uncertainty in engineering projects by embedding flexibility and allowing for adaptive and staged deployment. See, for example, Schwartz and Trigeorgis [2] . This paper presents a transparent ROV approach that is appropriate for engineering applications. It can be used by engineers interested in embedding flexibility in the technical design of systems for which the assumptions behind sophisticated and exotic approaches to financial options valuation are invalid. The suggested approach also enables direct comparison between flexible and rigid architectures or system configurations. This value-at-risk analysis-based ROV approach was formulated by de Neufville et al [3] in an effort to propagate systems thinking and flexibility in engineering design.
This approach is called "Real Options in Systems." The "in" indicates that it encourages engineers to explore technical flexibility levers that maximize systems' value, as opposed to performing Real Options analysis on the system without investigating how to design for flexibility into engineered systems. This value-at-risk ROV approach is described through an application to a case study involving the architecting of flexible satellite fleets and comparing them to a rigid baseline architecture.
Case Study: Satellite Fleet Design
This investigation applies value-at-risk analysis to rigid and flexible designs for a satellite fleet. It demonstrates how the analysis quantifies the value of flexibility and provides an example of how flexible designs manage uncertainty by shifting the distribution of possible outcomes to the right and, most specifically, by slashing the range of possible losses.
Like many complex systems, commercial communication satellites are designed for long lifetimes; in this case, 15 or more years of service. It is difficult to accurately forecast the demand for satellite services. Thus it is also difficult to properly identify a satellite's optimal set of design requirements in terms of geographical coverage, service type and required traffic capacity over this long operational lifetime in order to maximize its profitability. Identification of design requirements is even more problematic because of the evolutionary nature of the demand. Indeed, demand typically varies over time and changes rather than remain constant over a satellite lifetime because of demographics, competition from terrestrial services, political, economic or other factors.
When a satellite system is designed to satisfy a rigid set of requirements, i.e. provide a certain service type with a specific bandwidth capacity and geographical coverage, the operator risks large losses if the market the satellite system is designed to serve does not emerge as forecast. On the other hand, if the market under consideration indeed materializes but, for example, ends up requiring more capacity than anticipated, the operator might not be able to capture this additional revenue. Moreover, when a market changes dynamically over time, ambiguity is encountered in requirement specification as related to the appropriate mix of services and their associated capacity and coverage.
A central question is how to embed architectural flexibility in a communication satellite fleet such that the expected economic value is maximized. In engineering projects, flexibility can be built in via staged deployment. That is, an architecture could be configured into multiple stages that are built and brought to service over time based on market development. Using staged deployment to design for flexibility in individual commercial communication Geosynchronous spacecraft means that the spacecraft design itself has to be altered over its lifetime to adapt to emerging market conditions. This is especially hard because commercial communication satellites are typically inaccessible after launch.
One solution to provide flexibility is by on-orbit servicing. Researchers [4] have investigated the feasibility of various concepts of doing this. It remains to be seen whether this proves to be economically feasible. Moreover, for on-orbit servicing to materialize, engineers must first overcome some major technical challenges, which perhaps classifies on-orbit servicing as a possible future solution.
In contrast, the objective of the research presented in this paper is to embed flexibility in the design of commercial communication satellites using "current technology", assuming the unavailability of any kind of onorbit servicing. This approach provides solutions that could be implemented in the design of today's commercial communication satellite systems. Hassan et al [5, 6] provide more information on the detailed technical implementation of this approach.
The analysis presented in this paper assumes that the impact of design flexibility, which is provided on the spacecraft level, is valued on the fleet level in a system-ofsystems (SoS) context. That is, the ability of the spacecraft to provide different and/or similar communication services to multiple disconnected geographical markets at different stages during its lifetime provides flexibility on the operational level of a fleet such that losses could be minimized and revenue could be maximized. In that sense, the framework presented in this paper couples vehiclecentric design and operations-centric (fleet) architecting.
Dynamic Demand Uncertainty
The sample case study considers the demand evolution for a single satellite service in two geographically disconnected regions. This is a Ku-band fixed satellite service. The two regional markets under consideration have coverage area requirements of 40 and 52 deg 2 as viewed from Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO). These coverages define regions with areas similar to those of Continental Europe and Latin America. These areas will be referred to as: Coverage Areas I and II (CA-I and CA-II). The analysis assumes that these areas are disconnected and sufficiently distant that they can only be served from different orbital locations.
The demand in the two regions is assumed to follow the discrete distributions described in Figure 1 . A 20 year timeline is considered for the demand distributions and is divided into four five-year stages. The first stage spans years 1 to 5 (Y1 to Y5); the second stage spans years 6 to 10 (Y6 to Y10), and so on. The demand in each region or coverage area is assumed to have five discrete possibilities that are referred to as scenarios 1, 2, … 5 ( , , … ). The analysis assumes that there is no cross-strapping between the scenarios across the four stages. 
Fleet Architecting Framework
The fleet architecting framework is meant to tackle strategic planning problems exemplified in the challenges presented in the demand evolution section. In its current version, this framework is intended to answer questions related to the number of satellites in a fleet, satellite payload design as related to demand models, and amount of required payload flexibility. The main building blocks of this framework are schematically depicted in Figure 2 . The framework is organized to couple economic and technical domains. The economic domain houses the forecast market demand models for satellite services, which are uncertain and dynamic; and the ROV model, which probabilistically evaluates the Net Present Value (NPV) of a fleet and constructs the value-at-risk cumulative density function of an architecture. The technical domain houses the spacecraft (S/C) sizing and reliability models that are coupled with a Genetic Algorithm (GA), a heuristic optimization approach based on Darwin's Theory of Natural Selection, to find optimal spacecraft designs. 
Step I: Fleet Architecting Using Demand Models
Fleet architecting starts and ends in the economic domain. It embodies an iterative process between the economic and technical domains. A single iteration starts by investigating the demand models for satellite services over a number of potential geographical markets. It then generates a fleet architecture to satisfy parts of or all the demand predicted in these geographical markets. Four operational parameters related to the fleet architecture are decided upon at this stage of the design process and are passed to the next stage of the analysis. These parameters are: the number of coverage areas (geographical markets) that the fleet is going to serve, the mix of services it will provide in each coverage area, the number of spacecraft in the fleet, and the allocation of each spacecraft to serve one or more coverage areas. Those parameters are determined for each time stage.
The determination of the four fleet parameters maps the multistage operational strategy of the fleet and lays down the payload requirements for each spacecraft in the fleet. Spacecraft payload requirements may or may not include operational level flexibility requirements. For example, a rigid fleet architecture could correspond to two spacecraft, each of which is designed to serve exclusively one of the two independent coverage areas during all four stages in the 20-year lifetime of the project. On the other hand, a flexible fleet architecture may include a single spacecraft that incorporates payload capabilities (antenna size and transponder design) to serve CA-I or CA-II at different stages in this 20-year period, depending on demand materialization. The flexible spacecraft must also have the capability of moving itself to another orbital location when switching coverage areas. Step II: Spacecraft Design
The payload design requirements for each spacecraft in the fleet are passed from the economic to the technical domain. In the technical domain, the GA is coupled with the spacecraft sizing and reliability estimation models to find optimal spacecraft designs that satisfy the given payload requirements. The GA generates spacecraft designs with optimal combinations of technology choices and redundancy levels that minimize spacecraft launch mass (surrogate for cost) and satisfy reliability constraints. The GA is a global search method that performs optimization-like processes and uses a mix of deterministic and probabilistic rules to guide its search. The GA version implemented in this research uses tournament selection, uniform crossover and a small mutation rate. Goldberg provides more information about the GA [7] .
4.3
Step III: Revenue Estimation
After the technical domain generates optimal, feasible designs for the spacecraft systems in a given fleet architecture, the ROV module probabilistically evaluates revenue and cost, hence its expected net present value. Revenue estimation requires two inputs: models of the uncertain, dynamic forecasts of demand similar to the distributions in Figure 1 ; and the payload design parameters of the spacecraft in the fleet, including the number of available transponders designated to each service type and all the coverage areas those transponders are designed to serve at any stage in the 20-year time span.
4.4
Step IV: Cost Estimation
The last step in an iteration in the fleet architecting framework is the estimation of the cost of the generated fleet architecture. This is divided into spacecraft acquisition, launch, insurance and operating costs. The spacecraft cost is determined by the designs of the spacecraft payload and bus, which is information passed onto the ROV model from the technical domain. For the same number of available transponders, a flexible spacecraft (one that could serve multiple coverage areas at different stages or provide multiple services) is more expensive than a rigid spacecraft. The launch cost is mainly determined by the total wet mass of the spacecraft in the fleet, which again is information passed onto the ROV model from the technical domain. Finally, the operating cost is a function of the size of the spacecraft, but also varies with the operational strategy. The operating cost increases when two spacecraft are co-located in the same orbital position. For example, the operating cost of a single 60 transponder spacecraft is less than that of two 30 transponder spacecraft co-located in the same orbital position to serve a single coverage area.
System Architectures
The framework described in Figure 2 was used to generate one rigid and three flexible fleet architectures, along with their associated optimal spacecraft designs, as solutions meeting the requirements in Figure 1 . The rigid architecture includes two spacecraft; each dedicated to serve only one of the coverage areas for 15 years. The CA-I spacecraft provides services in the first, second, and third stages. It has 60 active transponders to meet the average forecast peak demand (in the first stage). The CA-II spacecraft provides services in the second, third, and fourth stages. It also has 60 active transponders, to meet the average forecast peak demand (in the fourth stage).
The three flexible fleets have different architectural configurations. They use combinations of four levers to embed architectural flexibility. The first lever is the payload flexibility switch that allows a spacecraft to serve either of the two coverage areas. The second and third levers are the number of spacecraft in a fleet and the payload size onboard each spacecraft. The fourth lever is the timing or relative sequencing of spacecraft deployment. Table 1 summarizes the architectural configurations. Note that flexible fleets II and III have the same configuration except that the second spacecraft in flexible fleet II is deployed at the beginning of the first stage while in flexible fleet III, it is deployed at the beginning of the second stage.
The GA, coupled with the spacecraft technical models, found optimal designs for each of the spacecraft in the four fleet architectures. Table 2 compares selected spacecraft design parameters that the GA produced and demonstrates the effect of change in payload requirements on the optimal design of the spacecraft.
Two facets of Table 2 are worth highlighting. First, in the rigid fleet architecture, although S/C I and S/C II have the same transponder design, the mass of S/C II is larger because CA-II is 12 deg 2 larger than CA-I. It thus requires a larger antenna to provide full coverage, which increases the structural mass of the spacecraft. Second, the single flexible S/C in flexible fleet I also has the same number of active transponders as S/C I and S/C II in the rigid fleet architecture. However, the flexibility requirements in the transponder design adds the mass of extra pairs of frequency filters for each transponder and decreases the HPA efficiency. This increases payload power requirements that in turn require more capabilities from the bus subsystems as shown in the design of the solar array, batteries and thermal radiator in Table 2 .
Value-at-Risk Analysis
Value-at-risk (VaR) analyses display the cumulative density function (CDF) of the possible outcomes of a Table 1 Table 2 . Selected parameters of optimal spacecraft designs for the fleet architectures in Table 1 Rigid ) 9.9 9.9 10.7 5. 
Valuation of the Rigid Fleet Architecture
The rigid architecture is representative of a traditional fleet design approach, which ignores uncertainties in demand evolution and determines payload requirements based on forecast peak demand. This rigid fleet cannot respond to changes in market demand. On the other hand, it offers the best possible use of spacecraft resources from a narrow technical perspective. For example, the HPA can be operated at a maximum efficiency of 58%, which minimizes payload power requirements. This usually leads to lighter, less expensive spacecraft systems. Note, however, that the objective of designing the spacecraft is not to maximize technical performance but overall economic efficiency.
The mean of the distribution in Figure 3 equals the E(NPV). For this rigid architecture, E(NPV) is $49.94 million with a standard deviation of $3.69 million. Note carefully that the probabilistic analysis of the NPV realistically estimates the fleet value, by accounting for the uncertainties associated with the evolution of the market demand. Deterministic NPV calculations lead strategists to overestimate significantly the value of the rigid fleet architecture. This is because deterministic estimates assume that demand stays constant at the payload size the spacecraft in the fleet is designed to support, for example in this case at the level of 60 transponders in each of the coverage areas over the life of the system. This assumption is invalid and unrealistic. Actual demand that generates an average load consists of higher demands (that a rigid system cannot serve) and lower demand (that entail losses). A traditional NPV valuation based on deterministic forecast leads to an NPV value of $73.21 million, a $23.27 million or 31% overestimate of the true value. As Figure 3 shows, The VaR provides decision makers with an idea about the maximum possible losses or gains their project could realize. For the rigid fleet architecture, the maximum possible loss is $162 million and the maximum possible profit is $192 million.
Decision-makers can obtain important information obtained from the cost analysis: the initial capital investment (CAPEX) required. A good general investment strategy is to choose projects with lowest CAPEX to minimize the possibility of early losses. In the space industry, this strategy is hard to achieve because most of the fixed cost of a fleet must be invested before generating any revenue from its services. Yet initial CAPEX can be used to compare the values of flexible and rigid fleet architectures. For the rigid fleet, the initial CAPEX is $242 million, which includes the cost of acquiring, launching and insuring S/C I that serves CA-I. At the beginning of the second stage, an additional $242 million must be paid for S/C II that serves CA-II. Using a 10% discount rate and ignoring inflation, the present value of the total CAPEX for the rigid architecture is estimated as $392 million.
Valuation of Flexible Fleet Architecture I
Flexible fleet architecture I comprises a single large flexible spacecraft with 60 active transponders and can serve either coverage area at a time. This single spacecraft configuration is inspired by the fact that a major cost element in CAPEX of a satellite system is the launch cost. Therefore, it is intuitive to think that the fewer the launches, the less costly the fleet, and the larger its financial value. Flexible fleet architecture I thus offers a huge improvement in economic value over that of the rigid fleet architecture. The increase in E(NPV) is almost 92%, corresponding to a flexibility value of $45.86 million. Flexible fleet architecture I offers this large increase in fleet value via risk minimization rather than revenue maximization. This becomes clear by comparing the tails of the CDFs, whose lower ends represent maximum possible losses, and whose upper ends represent maximum possible gains. The maximum gain that flexible fleet architecture I could obtain is nearly the same as that of the rigid architecture. However, the maximum loss for flexible fleet architecture I is only 41% of that of the rigid architecture. Fleet architecture I minimizes losses through its low CAPEX, whose present value is only 70% of that of the rigid architecture.
Valuation of Flexible Fleet Architecture II
Flexible fleet architecture II comprises two small spacecraft, each of which operates up to 30 active transponders and can serve either coverage area at a time. These two small spacecraft are deployed at the beginning of the first stage. This configuration is inspired by a relatively new trend in the commercial communication satellite industry towards acquisition of small to medium size spacecraft. Because the fleet is flexible, at any of the four stages, depending upon how demand materializes, the two spacecraft may need to be co-located in a single orbital spot to serve the same coverage area. Operating two spacecraft in one orbital location complicates the operational processes, which increases the operating cost. Although flexible fleet architecture II decreases the maximum possible loss of the rigid architecture by $31 million, it also decreases the maximum possible gain by $50 million. Therefore, the advantage of cutting maximum losses is partially reduced by the disadvantage of decreasing the maximum possible gain. Additionally, the value that the flexibility of the architecture offers is only $6.26 million. However, the true advantage of flexible fleet architecture II is that it requires a initial CAPEX of $341 million, only 87% of the present value of that required for the rigid fleet architecture.
Valuation of Flexible Fleet Architecture III
Flexible fleet architecture III has two small flexible spacecraft similar to flexible fleet architecture II. However, it deploys S/C II at the beginning of the second stage, whereas in flexible fleet architecture II, both spacecraft are deployed at the beginning of the first stage. This architecture is studied to investigate the effect of sequencing, which is one of the flexibility levers, on the financial performance of a fleet. The advantage of a delayed deployment of S/C II is that it decreases the present value of its CAPEX. However, having only one spacecraft in stage one eliminates the fleet's ability to capture large amount of revenue from CA-I early on.
The E(NPV) of flexible fleet architecture III is $19.40 million with a standard deviation of $1.63 million (compared to an E(NPV) of $49.94 and a deviation of $3.96 million for the rigid architecture). The maximum possible loss and gain for flexible fleet architecture III are $86 and $73 million respectively (compared to $162 and $192 million for the rigid fleet architecture). The only advantage of flexible fleet architecture III is that its NPV distribution has a small standard deviation and a tight NPV range. Its NPV range is only 45% of that of the rigid architecture and 58% of that of flexible fleet architecture II. This small spread might be preferred by a conservative satellite operator willing to sacrifice possible large gains in order to minimize risk significantly. In other words, the "value of flexibility" is now negative. The cost of flexibility for flexible fleet architecture III is $33.55 million. This cost could be considered as an insurance premium that a risk-averse satellite operator might be willing to pay.
Conclusions
The case study presented in this paper shows how the value-at-risk analysis can calculate the value of flexibility as regards increases in expected net present value and changes in maximum capital investment and losses. This approach to Real Options provides a simple, but powerful, economic framework that makes it possible to value flexibility in complex systems using a discounted cash flow approach that is well known to engineers, project mangers, and strategic decision makers.
The suggested value-at-risk analysis was applied to the architecting of commercial communication satellite fleets. The fleet architecting framework integrates economic valuation with spacecraft technical design to maximize the financial value of a fleet under uncertain, dynamic market conditions. A sample case study is presented where the demand evolution in two geographically disconnected markets is considered simultaneously over a 20 year time span. The forecast demand models show that while the demand is at peak in one market and is rapidly vanishing, the demand in the other market is nonexistent at present but quickly picks up and reaches a peak towards the end of the time window of the problem.
The fleet architecting framework comprises an economic and a technical domain. The economic domain includes uncertain, dynamic demand models, parametric cost and revenue models, and the value-at-risk Real Options valuation. The technical domain includes a spacecraft sizing model and a spacecraft reliability estimation model that are coupled with a Genetic Algorithm to generate optimal spacecraft designs. The inputs to the technical domain are payload and flexibility requirements that are generated and passed down from the economic domain based on forecast demand.
Four fleet configurations along with their optimal spacecraft designs were generated. One configuration is a traditional, rigid fleet architecture where each spacecraft is tuned to serve only one geographical market. Four flexibility levers are combined at different levels to generate three flexible fleet architectures. The first lever is flexible payload design that allows a spacecraft to serve either market at a time. The second and third levers are the number of spacecraft in a fleet and the size of the payload on each spacecraft. The fourth flexibility lever is the sequencing or deployment plan of the spacecraft over the 20 year period under consideration. The value-at-risk analysis shows that flexible fleet architectures provide significant economic value over that of the rigid fleet architecture.
Readers interested in Real Options should appreciate that the value-at-risk analysis provides much more information than a conventional Real Options analysis that only calculates the value of flexibility. As the results and discussion show, the value-at-risk analysis generates a range of information that can be useful to decision makers.
Designers should carefully note that the architectures that maximize the value of the system are often far different from those that maximize narrow technical efficiency. Indeed, in this case study, the rigid architecture that maximizes technical efficiency provides the most risky system, with far lower expected net present value, than the better flexible architecture alternatives.
We believe that the power of the suggested "Real Options in the system" analysis lies in its ability to empower engineers to find approaches that embed flexibility in complex systems and observe the value of flexibility using value-at-risk distributions. Being able to perform this simple economic analysis will allow engineers to change their designs to manipulate the value-at-risk distributions in ways that are favorable to the stakeholders of the systems.
